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1 hour ago, Lordmandeep said:

The focus is on prevention of further cases and a travel ban seems effective and the arguments against one seem to be based on political correctness.


See my previous post.

A travel ban specifically for non-citizens isn't meaningful. The virus doesn't behave any differently in citizens and non-citizens, treating them the same way isn't political correctness, it's a rational response informed by scientific fact. There may come a time when a travel ban for non-citizens makes sense, and at that time it will also mean that citizens should be completely quarantined. (ie. also effectively barred from entering)

Now is not that time. The risk presented by travellers from China not covered by the exit ban is very, very low (see above), and therefore a travel ban for rest of China is a disproportionate measure. The other measures being taken are more than sufficient to contain the virus, as has been demonstrated by the complete containment of the existing cases here.

I would argue that the moves to bar non-citizens from entering are in fact being based on politics, rather than the other way around.

Edited by Jason
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It has been 100 years since the last realy bad worldwide pandemic;(the Spanish Flu epidemic of 1918;killed people then died in World War One) we might be overdue for one. Law of probablity always catches up with you.

Yes, medical science has made enormous strides since then, but then in an age of jet travel the virus can travel much,much, faster.

Problem with travel bans is no way to make them 100% effective. And all it takes is just a couple of cases......

And yeah, the current bans seem to political pandering.

 

 

 

 

Edited by dudalb

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4 hours ago, Jason said:


See my previous post.

A travel ban specifically for non-citizens isn't meaningful. The virus doesn't behave any differently in citizens and non-citizens, treating them the same way isn't political correctness, it's a rational response informed by scientific fact. There may come a time when a travel ban for non-citizens makes sense, and at that time it will also mean that citizens should be completely quarantined. (ie. also effectively barred from entering)

Now is not that time. The risk presented by travellers from China not covered by the exit ban is very, very low (see above), and therefore a travel ban for rest of China is a disproportionate measure. The other measures being taken are more than sufficient to contain the virus, as has been demonstrated by the complete containment of the existing cases here.

I would argue that the moves to bar non-citizens from entering are in fact being based on politics, rather than the other way around.

 

 

Thing is the disease came to canada through people from china though...

 

Blocking travellers from the host country prevents further chain of inflections from outside and we can worry on the internal ones.

 

The point is to prevent further infections in canada and regardless of people try to convince otherwise I think a travel ban seems more then sensible.

 

 

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Is it just coincidence that the biological weapons research centre AKA "Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory" is just 20 miles from the reported outbreak centre ?

Edited by AndyK

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1 hour ago, AndyK said:

Is it just coincidence that the biological weapons research centre AKA "Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory" is just 20 miles from the reported outbreak centre ?


It's a biosafety lab, not weapons research.

Yes, it's a coincidence.

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49 minutes ago, Jason said:


It's a biosafety lab, not weapons research.

Yes, it's a coincidence.

Of course it is *wink* *wink*

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2 hours ago, AndyK said:

Of course it is *wink* *wink*


Forgive me if I'm missing humour.

The idea that the virus was part of a weapons program is one that is profoundly in conflict with the facts, so much so that I'm not sure where to start.

The DNA sequence of the virus is known. You don't trust the government of China? Doesn't matter, infections outside of China means that the sequence can be independently confirmed.

That sequence has very high sequence similarity with a virus that had already been identified as a natural virus from bats in China. Western scientists have independently verified this (and it's not that difficult to verify), and confirmed that there's no indication whatsoever that the coronavirus has been engineered in some way.

If you think that for some reason this lab grabbed the natural coronavirus as part of a weapons program, it's a ludicrously poor candidate for a weapon because it's highly contagious but not very lethal (~2%), which is about the exact opposite of what you want as a weapon.

This article is pretty good, touches on some of what I said and also mentions stuff I didn't bother to:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/29/experts-debunk-fringe-theory-linking-chinas-coronavirus-weapons-research/
 

Edited by Jason
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6 hours ago, AndyK said:

Is it just coincidence that the biological weapons research centre AKA "Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory" is just 20 miles from the reported outbreak centre ?

Considering the population of the region sound very likely.

 

That a list of high level biosafety laboratory:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biosafety_level#List_of_BSL-4_facilities

 

National Service of Healthcare and Agriculture Quality (SENASA) Buenos Aires, Argentina   Diagnostic laboratory for Foot-and-mouth disease.[25]
Australian Animal Health Laboratory Geelong, Victoria, Australia 1985 Capable of housing from large experimental animals to insects under conditions that exceed all BSL 4 requirements. The antecedent of all such facilities developed since the 1980's. Arguably the most researched design and construction project ever. AAHL is subdivided into a number of isolation zones that can be managed at differing containment levels concurrently. CSIRO AAHL Project Manager and Architect, William Curnow, provided technical reviews to Canadian, Indian, UK and French Authorities and consulted with Dr Jerry Callis [PIADC] to UN FAO on matters of bio-containment.
University of Melbourne – Doherty Institute for Infection and Immunity Melbourne, Victoria, Australia 2014 Diagnostic reference lab.[26][27]
National High Security Laboratory Melbourne, Victoria, Australia   Operates under the auspice of the Victoria Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory.[28]
Laboratório Nacional Agropecuário de Minas Gerais (Lanagro/MG) Pedro Leopoldo, Minas Gerais, Brazil 2014 Focus on Agropecuary diseases and diagnostics.[29]
National Microbiology Laboratory Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada   Located at the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health, it is jointly operated by the Public Health Agency of Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency.[30]
Wuhan Institute of Virology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences Wuhan, Hubei, China 2015 Wuhan Institute of Virology has existed since 1956 and already hosted BSL3 laboratories. A BSL4 facility was completed in 2015, and became the first, only and visible BSL-4 laboratory in China.[31]
Biological Defense Center Těchonín, Pardubice Region, Czech Republic 1971, rebuilt 2003-2007 Hospital and research facility. Located at the Centrum biologické ochrany (Biological Defense Center). Operated by Army of the Czech Republic.[32]
Jean Mérieux BSL-4 Laboratory Lyon, Metropolis of Lyon, France 1999 Built and owned by the Fondation Mérieux. Since 2004, operated by INSERM.[33]
Laboratoire de la DGA Vert-le-Petit, Essonne, France 2013 Operated by the Ministry of Defense.[34]
Centre International de Recherches Médicales de Franceville Franceville, Haut-Ogooué Province, Gabon   This facility is operated by a research organization supported by both Gabonese (mainly) and French governments, and is West Africa's only P4 lab (BSL-4).[35]
Robert Koch Institute Berlin, Germany 2015 Diagnostic and experimental lab facility.[36]
Bernhard Nocht Institute for Tropical Medicine Hamburg, Germany 2014 Part of the Leibniz Center Infection. National reference lab for tropical viruses.[37]
Friedrich Loeffler Institute Isle of Riems, Greifswald, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Germany 2010 Focus on animal viral diseases and diagnostics.[38]
Philipps University of Marburg Marburg, Hesse, Germany 2008 Focuses on hemorrhagic fever viruses.[39]
Országos Epidemiológiai Központ – National Center for Epidemiology Budapest, Hungary 1998 Division of Virology operates three WHO National Reference Laboratories. The BSL-4 biosafety laboratory provides a modern means to process dangerous imported zoonotic viral pathogens.[40]
University of Pécs Pécs, Hungary 2016 Opened in 2016, part of "Szentágothai János Kutatóközpont".
High Security Animal Disease Laboratory (HSADL) Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India 1998 This facility deals especially to zoonotic organisms and emerging infectious disease threats.[41]
Centre for Cellular and Molecular Biology Hyderabad, Telangana, India 2009 National BSL-4 Containment Facility for Human Infectious Diseases.[42]
Microbial Containment Complex Pune, Maharashtra, India 2012 Run by the National Institute of Virology.[43]
Istituto Nazionale per le Malattie Infettive Rome, Lazio, Italy 1997 The "National Institute of Infectious Diseases" used to operate within the Lazzaro Spallanzani hospital; the facility is now independent and is home to five BSL-3 labs as well as a single BSL-4 laboratory, which was completed in 1997.[44]
National Institute for Infectious Diseases Musashimurayama, Tokyo, Japan 2015 Located at National Institute for Infectious Diseases, Department of Virology I. Built in 1981; operated at BSL-3 until 2015 due to opposition from nearby residents.[45]
Institute of Physical and Chemical Research (RIKEN) Tsukuba, Ibaraki Prefecture, Japan 1984 Facility completed in 1984 but not operated as BSL-4 due to local opposition.[46]
State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology (VECTOR) Koltsovo, Novosibirsk Oblast, Russia   One of two WHO-approved facilities for work on variola virus.[14]
National Institute for Communicable Diseases Johannesburg, Gauteng, South Africa 2002 [47]
Public Health Agency of Sweden Solna, Stockholm County, Sweden 2001 The only BSL-4 facility in the Nordic region. Constructed for research and diagnostics of hemorrhagic fever viruses.[48]
University Hospital of Geneva Geneva, Canton of Geneva, Switzerland   "Glove box" type laboratory; primarily for handling clinical samples.[49]
Spiez Laboratory Spiez, Canton of Bern, Switzerland 2013 Run by Federal Office for Civil Protection and the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports.[50]
Institute of Medical Virology Zurich, Canton of Zurich, Switzerland   Part of the University of Zurich. Primary purpose is diagnostics of highly pathogenic viruses.[50]
Institute of Preventive Medicine National Defense University, Taiwan   [51]
Francis Crick Institute Camden, Greater London, United Kingdom 2015 Has BSL-4 space but does not work on human pathogens.[52]
Health Protection Agency's Centre for Infections Colindale, Greater London, United Kingdom   Department of Health laboratory. Diagnostics for various viral diseases.[53] Part of the European Network of Biosafety-Level-4 Laboratories.[54]
National Institute for Medical Research Mill Hill, Greater London, United Kingdom   Medical Research Council laboratory. Research and diagnostics for highly pathogenic viruses. Closed in 2017 and work moved to the Francis Crick Institute. Site demolished in 2018. [53]
National Institute for Biological Standards and Control Potters Bar, Hertfordshire, United Kingdom   Department of Health and Home Office laboratory. Develop assays and reagents for research on virulent pathogens.[53]
Veterinary Laboratories Agency Addlestone, Surrey, United Kingdom   Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs laboratory. Diagnostics and research for animal diseases.[53]
Institute for Animal Health Pirbright, Surrey, United Kingdom   Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council laboratory. Research on highly pathogenic animal diseases.[53]
Merial Animal Health Pirbright, Surrey, United Kingdom   Private lab. Produces vaccines against foot and mouth disease and bluetongue disease.[53]
Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response Porton Down, Wiltshire, United Kingdom   Department of Health laboratory. Diagnostics and research for haemorrhagic fever viruses.[53] Part of the European Network of Biosafety-Level-4 Laboratories.[54]
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Porton Down, Wiltshire, United Kingdom   Ministry of Defence laboratory. Focuses on protection from biological weapons.[53]
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Division of Vector Borne Diseases Fort Collins, Colorado, United States   A BSL 3/4 facility that operates in connection with some of CSU's biomedical research programs. The Fort Collins, Colorado location specializes in arboviral and bacterial diseases.[55]
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Atlanta, Georgia, United States   Currently operates in two buildings. One of two facilities in the world that officially hold smallpox.[14]
Georgia State University Atlanta, Georgia, United States 1997 Research focus on B virus.[56]
National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF), Kansas State University Manhattan, Kansas, United States 2022 (expected) Under construction. Facility to be operated by the Department of Homeland Security, and replace the Plum Island Animal Disease Center. Expected to be operational by 2022-2023.[57]
National Institutes of Health (NIH) Bethesda, Maryland, United States   Located on the NIH Campus, it currently only operates with BSL-3 agents.[58]
Integrated Research Facility Fort Detrick, Maryland, United States   Operated by NIAID. Focuses on animal models of human diseases.[59]
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center Fort Detrick, Maryland, United States   Operated by the Department of Homeland Security. Focus on potential bioterrorism threats.[60]
US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) Fort Detrick, Maryland, United States 1969 Run by the U.S. Army. Research focuses on biological threats to the U.S. military.[61][62]
National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory (NEIDL), Boston University Boston, Massachusetts, United States Built 2008, Opened 2012[63], BSL-4 Approval in 2017 [64] Focus on potential threats to public health.[65]
Rocky Mountain Laboratories Hamilton, Montana, United States 1928 NIAID laboratory. Focus on vector-borne diseases.[66]
Galveston National Laboratory, National Biocontainment Facility Galveston, Texas, United States   Opened in 2008, facility is operated by the University of Texas Medical Branch.[67]
Shope Laboratory Galveston, Texas, United States 2004 Operated by the University of Texas Medical Branch.[68]
Texas Biomedical Research Institute San Antonio, Texas, United States 1999 The only privately owned BSL-4 lab in the US.[69]
Osong Laboratory Osong, North Chungcheong Province, South Korea 2017 First BSL-4 Lab in South Korea

 

 

 

The chance that coincidentally a virus start in a 50 KM radius and look linked to us must be rather large considering how many of them there is and how they tend to be near the biggest urban cities enough to not be really special for it to happen at least, combined on how little it seem to be "weapon" grade type....

 

1 hour ago, Jason said:

for a weapon because it's highly contagious but not very lethal (~2%),

I would push the idea that 2% would not be very lethal that sound a lot if it is not 50 time less on young people than that or that we know yet, the 2% seem to be a spin using total know death case / total known case and not say how percentage dies on those that are either death or got well again (i.e. those we know their fate).

 

2% would be giant, I imagine it is a shortcut to say 2% of those who get so bad and goes to the emergency for it.... and I feel that among those in 2 month they could say 3-4% instead of 2.

 

Edited by Barnack
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47 minutes ago, Barnack said:

I would push the idea that 2% would not be very lethal that sound a lot if it is not 50 time less on young people than that or that we know yet, the 2% seem to be a spin using total know death case / total known case and not say how percentage dies on those that are either death or got well again (i.e. those we know their fate).

 


It is indeed actually probably lower, because there's a lot of evidence to suggest there's a whole bunch of undetected/unconfirmed cases in Wuhan/Hubei. (Deaths are a priority for testing as they can't possibly test everyone with mild symptoms, and it's now known that some patients present with only mild symptoms resembling a cold.)

Even the upper limit of the estimated probable mortality rate, 4%, is not very lethal by the standards of a bioweapon, especially since the deaths tend to happen to patients over 50 or with underlying conditions.

Now-defunct weapons programs focused on diseases that were much more fatal and less contagious, for reasons that I think should be obvious.

(To be clear, 2% mortality rate is bad news, even 1% is. But it's not bioweapon-level bad.)

Edited by Jason
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Just now, Jason said:


It's actually probably lower, because there's a lot of evidence to suggest there's a whole bunch of undetected/unconfirmed cases in Wuhan/Hubei. Even the upper limit of the estimated probable mortality rate, 4%, is not very lethal by the standards of a bioweapon, especially since the deaths tend to happen to patients over 50 or with underlying conditions.

Now-defunct weapons programs focused on diseases that were much more fatal and less contagious, for reasons that I think should be obvious.

(To be clear, 2% mortality rate is bad news, even 1% is. But it's not bioweapon-level bad.)

Its China, you will not know if anything has duel purpose...and anyway researching virus for weapons, it does not have to be lethal, that's the whole point of the research, to see how to make them lethal.

 

In any case, they def have coronavirus in their labs in the form of SARs, that much is known, who knows what else they are researching and there is no suggestion if it was the source, that it was a deliberate release. The Chinese are just not that good at health, hygene and safety.

 

The last smallpox outbreak in the UK was the result of a research lab leak.

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40 minutes ago, AndyK said:

Its China, you will not know if anything has duel purpose...and anyway researching virus for weapons, it does not have to be lethal, that's the whole point of the research, to see how to make them lethal.

 

In any case, they def have coronavirus in their labs in the form of SARs, that much is known, who knows what else they are researching and there is no suggestion if it was the source, that it was a deliberate release. The Chinese are just not that good at health, hygene and safety.

 

The last smallpox outbreak in the UK was the result of a research lab leak.


No. We're not even close to having that kind of capability, to be able to look at viral DNA sequences and know what changes need to be made to make them more lethal. I actually have some familiarity with this topic, with biochemistry and molecular genetics being the main focus of my undergraduate degree, and a substantial part of my graduate research.

There are lots of vastly more plausible reasons to have viral samples on hand than as parts of a weapons program. It's also vastly more likely that the virus would come from nature, than from a research or weapons program which would have many safeguards in place.

Yes, the UK fucked up bigtime with smallpox back in 1978, some 42 years ago. Last time I checked, viruses spread around in nature ... every single day. A study checked about 400 people who lived near caves in Yunnan, and 3% of them had antibodies to bat coronaviruses, meaning that these coronaviruses spread from bat to human quite frequently. But in the absence of high population density, the infection ends there instead of starting human-to-human transmission.

The virus escaping via a live-animal wildlife market in a densely populated city is vastly, vastly more likely. It's actually exactly what you expect would eventually happen, in a country with live animal markets and high population density. Every disease that infects humans ultimately jumped from some other animal at some point.

Skeptical though you may be of Chinese hygiene, I would think their scientists are more careful than butchers at wildlife markets. In any case, scientists from other countries collaborated with researchers at the Wuhan facility and can attest to its controls.

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16 hours ago, AndyK said:

Of course it is *wink* *wink*

Wuhan is the size of London. Most cities that size will have major technology and scientific research centres - whether it's biological research or weapons development. 

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50 minutes ago, Avatree said:

Wuhan is the size of London. Most cities that size will have major technology and scientific research centres - whether it's biological research or weapons development. 

Except the one in Wuhan is the only one in the whole of China capable of and actively researching Corona viruses.

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Looking at history there is a lot of evidence of Animal to Human disease spread then a super weapon being leaked. @JasonDisease can spread in odd ways...

 

The black death originated from Mormants in Siberia and stayed isolated as no one really ventured in and out of those remote areas. 

 

The fleas on those animals would bite humans and so on.

 

With the Mongol Empire increasing Global Links, the disease was able to go along the Silk road and infect all of Eurasia and become the greatest calamity in all our history. 

 

One thing that made the Black Death so horrific was the disease would sometimes in an infected city change into the pneumonic plague which allowed human to human transmission and is almost always lethal with antibiotics.

 

I think my bigger worry with this Virus is that if MERS or Sars spreads as easily as this Virus because those have a death rate of 35% and 10%. 

Edited by Lordmandeep
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